We examine a …rm that can license its production technology to a rival when …rms are heterogeneous in production costs. We show that a complete technology transfer from one …rm to another always increases joint pro…t under weakly concave demand when at least three …rms remain in the industry. A jointly pro…table transfer may reduce social welfare, although a jointly pro…table transfer from the most e¢ cient …rm always increases welfare. We also consider two auction games under complete information: a standard …rst-price auction and a menu auction by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). With natural re…nement of equilibria, we show that the resulting licensees are ordered by degree of e¢ ciency: menu auction, simple auction, and joint-pro…t maximizing licensees, in (weakly) descending order. JEL:D4, L24, L4
Introduction
We examine the licensing of production technology to a rival …rm in a product market while relaxing the standard assumption that the rivals are homogeneous in their production technologies. Speci…cally, we assume that …rms engage in Cournot competition and di¤er in their constant marginal costs of production, and that a technology transfer reduces the licensee's marginal cost to the level of the licensor. 1 We are interested in the direct e¤ects of licensing; so, to abstract from any possible e¤ects of collusion, we adopt the standard assumption in the literature that the production decisions of …rms remain independent after transfer. We focus on a setting of complete information where a single licensor chooses an exclusive licensing partner from heterogeneous rivals, resulting in negative externalities of licensing to third-party …rms. 2 We allow for the possibility of some third-party …rms' shutting down after the transfer. We analyze …rst the gains in joint pro…t for the licensor and a licensee from licensing, and then the social welfare gains. Then, we consider two auction games to determine the licensee. We begin, following the seminal work by Katz and Shapiro (1985) , by analyzing whether such a transfer is always jointly pro…table in a Cournot model. 3 Katz and Shapiro (1985) have shown that a complete technology transfer (where the licensee ends up with the same cost as the licensor) could reduce joint pro…t in a duopoly if the licensor has a near-monopoly position, because the transfer would reduce the licensor's near-monopoly pro…t. La Manna (1993) shows that when there are at least three …rms in the market, a complete technology transfer to another …rm is always joint pro…t improving if the demand is linear. We show that La Manna's result extends even if we allow for weakly concave demand. This is not a trivial exercise: we can neither explicitly calculate equilibrium nor use simple comparative static techniques, because a partial technology transfer can reduce joint pro…t. 4 Nevertheless, by introducing arti…cial markets as a device, we can show that a complete technology transfer is always jointly pro…table if the demand curve is weakly concave and there are at least three …rms in the market after the transfer (Theorem 1). That is, a complete transfer is always jointly pro…table independent of its 1 This implies that the size of the technology transfer varies with the licensee's e¢ ciency (a less e¢ cient rival receives a larger transfer). 2 For example, Jehiel et al. (1996) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) in examining a single transfer allow for the presence of private information at the auction stage.
In this paper, we analyze auction methods in licensing, but we concentrate on the e¤ects of (negative) externalities on auction outcomes. 3 This is also equivalent to …xed fee licensing, examined by Kamien and Tauman (1986) . 4 See Creane and Konishi (2009b) .
absolute size and the relative e¢ ciency of the licensor. 5 We then focus on which partner would maximize joint pro…t. At …rst glance, one might expect that this would be the most ine¢ cient rival. We …nd that for weakly concave demand, neither the very ine¢ cient nor the very e¢ cient rival maximizes joint pro…t (Observation 1). With heterogeneous …rms, the less e¢ cient the licensee is, the greater the technology transfer will be. On the one hand, a technology transfer to a nearly equally e¢ cient rival is very small and holds little bene…t for the rival's pro…t, although such a transfer does not substantially reduce the market price and the licensor's pro…t. On the other hand, a technology transfer to a very ine¢ cient …rm bene…ts the licensee greatly but reduces the licensor's output and pro…t through a large reduction in the market price. Given that pro…t is convex in output, the licensor's pro…t reduction is large if the technology transfer is made to a very ine¢ cient …rm. Hence, the licensor is better o¤ choosing a partner who is neither very e¢ cient nor very ine¢ cient.
Turning to the welfare e¤ects of a technology transfer, it is known that making an ine¢ cient …rm slightly more e¢ cient can actually reduce welfare (Lahiri and Ono 1988) . This implies that, as a corollary of Theorem 1, a jointly pro…table transfer can reduce social welfare if there are more than two …rms and if both the licensor and licensee are su¢ ciently similar and ine¢ cient (Observation 2). In contrast, Katz and Shapiro (1985) …nd that pro…table transfers never reduce welfare in a duopoly, which underlies the importance of considering non-duopoly markets. Katz and Shapiro (1986) and Sen and Tauman (2007) …nd that with homogeneous …rms, licensing always raises welfare, so heterogeneity is important in evaluating the welfare implications of licensing. Although a transfer from a su¢ ciently ine¢ cient licensor can reduce welfare, we show that if the most e¢ cient …rm makes a complete transfer then social welfare always increases under general demand (Theorem 2). However, a joint-pro…t-maximizing licensee is not necessarily a social-welfare-maximizing licensee, because the joint-pro…t-maximizing selection does not take into account the negative externalities imposed on other …rms. Since technology transfers a¤ect the rival …rms' production decisions, including those of e¢ cient rivals, total costs can be lower with a more e¢ cient licensee. The conclusion for the policy maker whose goal is to maximize social welfare is that the most e¢ cient …rm should not be discouraged from licensing its technology to rivals; but technology transfers between marginal …rms should bear some scrutiny.
Analyzing the joint-pro…t-maximizing licensee is a natural benchmark because it allows comparisons to Katz and Shapiro (1985) as well as work that examines …xed-fee setting licensing (e.g., Kamien and Tauman 1986) , and, as we will see, it is useful for later analysis. 6 However, when there is more than one rival, licensing to a joint-pro…t-maximizing partner does not exploit the entire possible gains for the licensor if the licensor can credibly threaten to …nd a new partner during negotiations. That is, competition among potential licensees over the technology transfer should be more pro…table in the presence of externalities. Katz and Shapiro (1986) , and others since, 7 have taken this into account when they examine an auction game in a homogeneous licensee environment by endogenizing the number of licenses. We follow their approach, but do so in a setting with heterogeneous …rms, and ask which …rm would win the right to use the technology and how much the licensor would collect from licensing. Speci…cally, we examine what happens when the most e¢ cient …rm (the natural analogy to homogeneous rivals) uses …rst-price auction mechanisms to sell the right to use its technology. In the …rst-price auction method (a simple auction game), which is a modi…cation of the method used by Katz and Shapiro (1986) to take into account a heterogeneous …rm environment, each potential licensee submits a bid and only the winner pays for the bid. Since there are many Nash equilibria and most of them are not very plausible, we re…ne the set of Nash equilibria by stipulating that non-licensees would not be worse o¤ if the licensor happens to choose it: truthful Nash equilibrium (TNE in simple auction). Roughly speaking, this is akin to a "trembling-hand" re…nement. In this re…ned set of Nash equilibria, the licensing fee can be pinned down, and the licensee is the partner that maximizes the joint pro…t of the licensee, the licensor, and any other potential rival. Given the complex negative externalities created by technology transfer, even if a …rm is not willing to bid enough to win the license it might …nd it pro…table to bribe the licensor to in ‡uence which of its rivals does obtain the license. 8 For this reason, we also consider a menu auction (Bernheim and Whinston 1986) in which each potential licensee submits a menu that speci…es contingent payments to the licensor for each possible licensee the licensor might select. We again re…ne the set of Nash equilibria to the set of truthful Nash equilibria (TNEs in menu auction). 9 We show that a simple auction licensee is at least 6 This can also be justi…ed by noting that often a licensee is selected and then the two parties negotiate the contract. Since negotiating a technology transfer is not trivial, it may be too costly for the licensor to credibly threaten to license to a di¤erent …rm, and so the fee should be determined as a function of the increase in their joint pro…t. In this case, the joint-pro…t-maximizing licensee should be selected by the licensor as the recipient of the technology. 7 For a review of auctions in licensing, see Giebe and Wolfstetter (2007 (Claburn, 2011) . 9 Truthful Nash equilibria in a simple auction and in a menu auction appear to be similar in their de…nitions, but their implications are somewhat di¤erent. In a simple auction, TNE is a rather innocuous re…nement of Nash equilibrium, whereas in a menu auction, TNE has implications for communication-as e¢ cient as a joint-pro…t-maximizing partner, and a menu auction licensee is at least as e¢ cient as a simple auction licensee (Theorem 3).
In the next section, we introduce the basic modeling assumptions. Section 3 examines the e¤ect of the amount of technology transferred on pro…t and examines the implications of partner type. Section 4 contains the welfare analysis. Section 5 identi…es which …rm will get the right to use the technology in license auction games. Section 6 provides extensions of our analysis in the case of multiple licensees and license contracts with royalties. We provide a number of intriguing observations, but the results are sensitive to the setup of the license game. It seems di¢ cult to obtain general results.
The Model
We consider a basic Cournot market structure. There is a commodity besides a numeraire good, and its (inverse) demand is a continuous function P (Q) in [0; Q] that is twice continuously di¤erentiable with P 0 (Q) < 0 for all Q 2 (0; Q) and P ( Q) = 0. There are K …rms in the market with no …xed cost of production. Firms are indexed as i 2 f1; : : : ; Kg and di¤er in their constant marginal costs c i . We order …rms by degree of e¢ ciency: c 1 c 2 : : : c K . With a small abuse of notation, let the set f1; 2; : : : ; Kg be denoted by K as well.
Each …rm i's production level is denoted by q i . Firm i's pro…t function is written as
where Q = P i2K q i . The …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization (assuming an interior solution) is
This implies
and …rm i's pro…t is written as
We assume the strategic substitutability condition throughout the paper: for all i 2 K, P 00 (Q)q i + P 0 (Q) 0:
based re…nement (Bernheim and Whinston 1986).
Note that the second-order condition for pro…t maximization (P 00 (Q)q i + 2P 0 (Q) 0) is guaranteed by strategic substitutability. Strategic substitutability is weaker than the requirement that the demand is weakly concave P 00 (Q) 0. 10 In proving some of our main results, we strengthen strategic substitutability condition by the weak concavity of demand. The strategic substitutability condition guarantees the uniqueness of equilibrium. Let C = P i2K c i denote the aggregate marginal cost. We now present a standard result, whose derivation, which can be found in the appendix along with all subsequent proofs, will be useful for later analysis. Lemma 1. Under the strategic substitutability condition, the equilibrium is unique. Moreover, keeping other …rms'marginal costs intact, an increase in c j decreases the equilibrium aggregate output Q if c j < P (Q), and has no e¤ect otherwise.
Production Technologies and Transfers
Each …rm i has its own technology for producing the commodity (the marginal cost of production is c i ), and it has the property right to its own technology (e.g., it holds a patent). We adopt the standard assumption in the literature that the output decisions remain independent after any transfer, a condition that is usually imposed by competition authorities. Firm i can license its technology with an exclusive usage agreement to another …rm. As is also standard in the literature (Katz and Shapiro 1986 , etc.), we assume complete technology transfer throughout the paper: the obtaining …rm j (licensee) reduces its marginal cost to that of …rm i. That is, if …rms i and j have technologies with marginal costs c i and c j with c i < c j , respectively, then …rm j can reduce its marginal cost of production to c i by adopting …rm i's technology.
The following lemma also plays a key role in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 2. Suppose that there are initially K …rms engaging in production. Pick three …rms i, j, and j 0 with c i < c j < c j 0 , and consider two scenarios: (i) …rm i transfers its technology to …rm j, and (ii) …rm i transfers its technology to …rm j 0 . Then, equilibrium aggregate outputQ in scenario (i) is not more than equilibrium aggregate outputQ in scenario (ii), resulting in P (Q) P (Q).
10 That is, the weak concavity of demand implies the second-order condition for pro…t maximization. Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that complete transfers could reduce joint pro…ts in a duopoly; here, we examine whether this result can extend to markets with more than two …rms. We can show that under weakly concave demand (which includes linear demand), a complete technology transfer is always pro…table if there is at least one other …rm in the market. This somewhat surprising result has been known under a linear demand assumption by La Manna (1993). However, with more general demand, Katz and Shapiro (1985) found such transfers could be unpro…table when there are only two …rms in the market, and Creane and Konishi (2009b) show that partial transfers (i.e., the licensee's cost is not completely reduced to the licensor's cost) when …rms are heterogeneous could reduce joint pro…t. Since we have to compare pro…t levels of two discrete cases and a small transfer may reduce joint pro…t, we cannot simply rely on comparative statics on technology transfers: we need to utilize an arti…cial economy to prove the theorem. Theorem 1. Consider …rms i; j 2 K with c i < c j . Assume that …rm i is in operation originally, and that even after …rm i transfers technology to …rm j, another …rm k is still in operation (q k > 0) with c k 6 = c i . If demand is weakly concave (P 00 (Q) 0), then a complete technology transfer from …rm i to …rm j is joint pro…t improving.
Jointly Pro…table Transfers
Notice that we assume that at least three …rms remain in the market after the technology transfer. Although Katz and Shapiro (1985) obtain conditions for a complete transfer to reduce joint pro…t, they examine a duopoly case. The existence of a third …rm drives the theorem, as part of the gain to the licensee comes from the lost pro…ts of the other …rm(s). However, since a partial transfer could reduce joint pro…t, one may wonder how a complete transfer always increases joint pro…t. To intuitively see the reason for this, consider what happens when a partial technology transfer would reduce joint pro…t. In this case, consider what happens if, instead, the licensee's cost is increased (thereby raising joint pro…t) until the licensee is driven out of the market. Joint pro…t has now increased. At this point we note from the divisionalization literature (Baye et al. 1996 ) that if the licensee could create a second, identical division, then its pro…ts would increase.
Joint-Pro…t-Maximizing Partner
Whereas in the previous subsection we considered the pro…tability of technology transfers, in this subsection we consider which partner would maximize joint pro…t. That is, for …rm i, which …rm j would create the greatest increase in joint pro…t from a technology transfer? Recall that when the licensor chooses a less e¢ cient partner, this leads to a larger technology transfer.
Since we need to compare pro…ts when di¤erent partners have been chosen, for heuristic reasons it is more convenient to use linear demand with explicit solutions and assume that all …rms are in operation:
, and q i = 1+C K+1 c i . Then the change in the joint pro…t by …rms i and j from the technology transfer is (joint pro…t after transfer) (joint pro…t before transfer)
This is a quadratic function in the di¤erence in marginal costs c j c i . The …rst positive term increases if …rm j is a less e¢ cient partner, while the second negative term gains in magnitude as …rm j is a less e¢ cient partner. Hence, the gain is highest when c j is neither too big nor too small. Firm i should choose some …rm in the middle. Although the above analysis is based on an assumption of linear demand, a quantitatively similar result applies for general demand (see Creane and Konishi 2009b).
Observation 1. With a complete transfer, a joint-pro…t-maximizing partner for a …rm is neither too e¢ cient nor too ine¢ cient relative to the …rm under weakly concave demand.
This condition is intuitive: you cannot make a rival who is already e¢ cient that much more e¢ cient. Thus, there is some bene…t to picking a less e¢ cient rival, as there is a greater transfer and so an expected increase in pro…t of the licensee from the transfer. However, you do not want to pick too ine¢ cient of a rival. The reason is that as you pick a more ine¢ cient rival the technology transfer causes the price to fall more, harming you as well as the rival. At the same time, when considering su¢ ciently ine¢ cient …rms, a slightly more ine¢ cient …rm will not yield that much less pro…t (since its output is approaching zero, i.e., marginal cost is approaching the price) and the gain from selecting a slightly more ine¢ cient rival approaches zero.
Welfare E¤ects
We now investigate the e¤ects of technology transfers on social welfare, which is the sum of the …rms'pro…ts and consumer surplus. Since technology transfers reduce production cost, social welfare tends to increase with the amount of technology transferred. Indeed, Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that in a duopoly, licensing that increases joint pro…t always increases welfare (and welfare-decreasing licensing always decreases joint pro…t). Likewise, Sen and Tauman (2007) …nd licensing to be welfare improving under general licensing schemes when …rms are homogeneous.
However, a pro…table licensing could reduce welfare when …rms are heterogeneous. This possibility arises if a very ine¢ cient …rm obtains a technology transfer that reduces its cost only slightly; then its resulting increase in production will displace the production of more e¢ cient …rms, thereby reducing social welfare. This result has already been observed by Lahiri and Ono (1988) . The question, then, is whether this implies that jointly pro…table licensing can reduce welfare, contrary to previous results. Combining Theorem 1 with Lahiri and Ono's result, we are able to state that the previous results do not generalize to the case where there are more than two …rms and …rms are heterogeneous: pro…table licensing can be welfare reducing.
Given this result, one may wonder if there are conditions that guarantee that a technology transfer raises welfare. We show that if the most e¢ cient …rm makes a complete technology transfer, then welfare increases. The policy implications of these results appear straightforward. On the one hand, competition authorities should pay close attention to technology transfers (through licensing, joint venture, or merger) between marginal …rms (in the technological e¢ ciency sense) in an industry. On the other hand, the most e¢ cient …rm within an industry should not be discouraged from making a technology transfer to a rival.
Welfare-reducing Pro…table Licensing
We begin by presenting Lahiri and Ono's (1988) condition that a reduction in the marginal cost of an ine¢ cient …rm reduces social welfare. This observation leads to an immediate corollary to Theorem 1 that yields a result contrary to previous ones in the literature: there are pro…table technology transfers that reduce total welfare while bene…ting consumers. Corollary 1. Suppose that demand is weakly concave and that there are more than two …rms. Then, if …rm j has a su¢ ciently high marginal cost (c j ) and …rm i's marginal cost is su¢ ciently close to …rm j's, then …rm i licensing its technology to …rm j is jointly pro…table and welfare reducing even though consumer welfare (surplus) increases.
Previous results in the literature may at …rst glance appear to be similar even though they are quite distinct. First, Katz and Shapiro (1985) have shown that in a duopoly a technology transfer can reduce welfare, but only when it reduces joint pro…t. Hence, such transfers would never actually occur. In contrast, here there can be technology transfers that reduce welfare, but increase joint pro…t. Second, Faulí-Oller and Sandonís (2002) have shown that in a duopoly pro…table licensing can reduce welfare, but this requires the use of a royalty (raising the recipient's marginal cost) and only occurs in price competition. As they note, "the royalty works as a collusive device"and so reduces welfare. More generally, licensing contracts can reduce welfare if these contracts have collusive e¤ects (e.g., Shapiro 1985) . However, such e¤ects are absent in our model.
Welfare-improving Pro…table Licensing
Since technology transfers between ine¢ cient …rms can reduce welfare, the next question is whether there are conditions that guarantee that transfers increase welfare. Since the social welfare is reduced only because relatively ine¢ cient …rms'production crowds out more e¢ cient …rms'production, we can naturally propose that if the licensor is the most e¢ cient …rm then the social welfare should improve. Indeed, we can show that this is the case. For this result, we need no condition on demand function. Theorem 2. Suppose that the most e¢ cient …rm (…rm 1) makes a complete transfer to any …rm j (c 1 c 2 ::: c j : : : c K and c 1 < c j ). Then, the social welfare improves.
Interestingly, a social-welfare-maximizing partner is not necessarily the least e¢ cient …rm. Although aggregate output and consumer surplus are maximized by choosing the least e¢ cient …rm as partner, industry pro…t, which is also part of social welfare, may not be maximized. The following example illustrates how the harm to industry pro…t shows that welfare is not maximized by licensing to the least e¢ cient …rm. The social-welfare-maximizing partner is …rm 4, the consumer-surplus-maximizing partner is …rm 5, and the industry-pro…t-maximizing partner is …rm 3. A di¤erent way to see why …rm 4 maximizes social welfare is to note that social welfare equals consumers' total bene…t less the cost of production (which appears in industry pro…t). Licensing to the least e¢ cient …rm (…rm 5) does result in the greatest cost reduction; however, two countervailing e¤ects result in lower total costs when …rm 4 is licensed. First, total production by the lowest-cost …rms is greater when …rm 4 is licensed (the price is higher). Second, when …rm 4 is licensed, the least e¢ cient …rm still produces (…rm 5), but its production is quite small so its contribution to total cost is negligible, whereas when …rm 5 is licensed …rm 4's production is several times larger. As a result, in the above example, although licensing …rm 5 increases output by 0:01, total cost increases by 0:004, yielding a "marginal cost"of 0:4 well above the price.
Choosing a Licensee through Auctions
In this section, we study (i) which …rm wins the right to use the technology and (ii) how much is paid when the technology is licensed by auction. In a duopoly, there is only one potential licensee, and so a …xed-price licensing fee (calculated as the di¤erence between the licensee's post-transfer pro…t minus its original pro…t) is optimal. However, if there are multiple potential licensees, then they compete over the exclusive license. As noted by Katz and Shapiro (1986) , if one …rm obtains the license, its rivals su¤er from the market price reduction caused by the licensing. A …rm's auction bid, then, must take this externality into consideration. However, unlike in Katz and Shapiro (1986) , here the potential licensees are heterogeneous, and so the non-licensees di¤er in the harm from a given …rm winning the license and so in their willingness-to-pay. We consider two types of auctions: In the …rst, each potential licensee bids for the right to use the technology, and when a winner is selected, only the winner pays the license fee according to its bid (simple auction). In the second, each potential licensee o¤ers a menu that describes how much it will pay the licensor depending on which of the potential licensees gets the technology; when a winner is selected all potential licensees pay the licensor according to their bids for that particular winner (menu auction). These two license auctions have both advantages and disadvantages. A simple auction can be considered as a "natural" auction, since only the winner of the license auction pays for the license. However, the externalities created by potential licensees are not identical. If a …rm is harmed more by …rm j getting the license than …rm k, it obviously would prefer that …rm k instead of …rm j obtain the license and so might be willing to pay to bring this about. Hence, a menu auction captures a …rm's willingness to help one …rm obtain the license in order to lessen the negative externality from another …rm in a licensing market, although it seems less "natural"at …rst glance (and for this reason may be viewed disfavorably by competition authorities).
For the rest of the paper we assume that the licensor is the most e¢ cient …rm, …rm 1: i.e., c 1 < c 2 c 3 : : : c K . This is a natural setup for the licensing problem as it is (trivially) the structure discussed in the literature when the licensees are homogeneous, and as Theorem 2 assures, such a licensing will certainly improve the welfare. With a small abuse of notation, we denote k (j) as the pro…t of …rm k when …rm j obtains the license from …rm 1 for k for j = 1; : : : ; K.
Simple Auction
A simple auction is a version of the …rst-price auction played by …rms 2; 3; : : : ; K, in which each …rm k 2 f2; : : : ; Kg simultaneously o¤ers T k 0 to be the unique licensee to the licensor who chooses as a licensee …rm (say, …rm j) that maximizes the sum of …rm 1's pro…t and T j : i.e., j 2 M (T ) arg max k2f1;:::;Kg ( 1 (k) + T k ), where T = (T 1 ; T 2 ; : : : ; T K ).
(Recall that when j = 1, …rm 1's technology is not transferred to any …rm.) Knowing this, …rm k 2 f2; : : : ; Kg chooses its bid T k . In a simple auction, an outcome (j ; T ) is a Nash equilibrium if j 2 M (T ) and there is no k 2 f2; : : : ; Kg and
Although Nash equilibrium is the most basic equilibrium concept, there are too many equilibria including unnatural ones in which the winner of license may pay a high license fee only to match another …rm's o¤er that is an empty threat because the latter …rm would not want its o¤er accepted). In the light of this, we consider a reasonable re…nement of Nash equilibrium that is a version of truthful equilibrium. The idea is loosely related to the trembling-hand argument for the licensor. The licensor may make a slight mistake in choosing a potential licensee. Hence, each …rm would be better o¤ by making a weakly dominant o¤er relative to the equilibrium outcome. For …rm j 2 Knf1g, a strategy T j is truthful relative to j if and only if either (i) U j (j; T ) = U j ( j; T ) or (ii) U j (j; T ) < U j ( j; T ) and T j (j) = 0. A truthful Nash equilibrium (TNE) is a Nash equilibrium (j ; T ) such that each …rm chooses a truthful strategy relative to j . With this re…nement, we can pin down and characterize the unique equilibrium in the above example. 1 (j)+ j (j) for all j = 2; :::; K. Suppose that no licensing is not a TNE. Then, an outcome (j ; T ) is a TNE with licensing (j > 1), if and only if T j = max j2Knf1g f 1 (j)
The last condition means that …rm j is willing to challenge …rm j by paying more if …rm j gets the license. Suppose …rm j receives the license. Then …rm j 's payo¤ is j (j), and …rms 1 and j are jointly earning 1 (j) + j (j). That is, the sum of these three …rms'payo¤s is 1 (j) + j (j) + j (j). Now, if …rm j receives the license, then the total pro…t of these three …rms is 1 (j ) + j (j ) + j (j ). If this value exceeds 1 (j) + j (j) + j (j), …rm j can beat …rm j. If …rm j can beat all other potential licensees, …rm j wins the licensing auction. As a corollary of the …rst part of Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 (joint pro…t increases), we can state the following.
Corollary 2.
Under weakly concave demand, no licensing is not a TNE of the simple auction game if at least three …rms remain in operation after licensing.
We call the licensee in a truthful Nash equilibrium outcome a simple auction licensee. Without negative externalities, a joint-pro…t-maximizing partner is a simple auction licensee. Taking externalities into account, a …rm is a simple auction licensee if and only if such a transfer maximizes the joint pro…t of the licensor, the licensee, and any one potential licensee …rm-that is, if the licensor's pro…t plus the licensee's gain from another potential licensee's not getting the license is greater than the licensor's pro…t and the gain of this other potential licensee. Comparing a simple auction licensee and a joint-pro…t-maximizing partner, it turns out that a simple auction licensee, if one exists, is at least as e¢ cient as a joint-pro…t-maximizing partner.
Proposition 2. Under weakly concave demand, a simple auction licensee (if one exists) is at least as e¢ cient as a joint-pro…t-maximizing partner.
From the characterization of TNE (Proposition 1), it is easy to see that a Nash equilibrium in pure strategy must satisfy many inequalities. If there are only two potential licensees (K = 3), then it is easy to show the existence of TNE and to characterize it. However, if there are more than two potential licensees, …nding a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) is hard. Although we are unable to show the existence of a TNE in a simple auction game under weakly concave demand, we can show that it always exists if demand is linear and no …rm shuts down after any transfers (see Creane, Ko, and Konishi 2012).
Menu Auction
When …rm 1 (the most e¢ cient …rm) chooses to license its technology to a …rm (the licensee) j 2 N = Knf1g = f2; : : : ; Kg, there is a negative externality from the technology transfer for the other …rms not receiving the transfer (non-licensees N nf1; jg). Nonlicensees would like to in ‡uence the licensing decision and may be willing to o¤er money for …rm 1 not to license to …rm j. We try to capture such strategic interactions using the menu auction framework proposed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
A menu auction game in our context is described by (N + 2) tuples:
such that k : A ! R + is …rm k's pro…t function, where A is the set of licensor's actions. That is, k (a) denotes …rm k's pro…t when …rm 1 chooses action a 2 A. (In this section, A will be the set of potential licensees -who to license: A = K and a = 1 means "no license.") In the extensive form of the game, the potential licensees simultaneously o¤er contingent payments to the licensor, who subsequently chooses an action that maximizes her total payo¤. A strategy for each potential licensee k 2 N is a transfer function
, which is a monetary reward (or punishment) of T k (a) to the licensor for selecting action a 2 A, where b is the lower bound for transfer (we set b = 0 except for royalty case in Section 5). For each action a, potential licensee k receives a net payo¤:
where T = (T k 0 ) k 0 2N is a strategy pro…le. The licensor chooses an action that maximizes its total payo¤: the licensor selects an action in the set M (T ) with:
The menu auction game is merely a game among potential licensees, although, strictly speaking, a tie-breaking rule among M (T ) needs to be speci…ed for the licensor. An outcome of a menu auction game is (a; T ). An outcome (a ; T ) is a Nash equilibrium if a 2 M (T ) and there is no k 2 N such that T k : A ! [b; 1) and a 2 M T k ; T k such that U k (a; T ) > U k (a ; T ). Unfortunately, with so many coordination problems among the many players (potential licensees), there are too many Nash equilibria in a menu auction game.
To get plausible predictions among the many allocations supported by Nash equilibrium, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) consider a reasonable re…nement on the set of Nash equilibria and argue that "truthful strategies" are quite crucial in menu auctions. A strategy T k is truthful relative to a if and only if for all a 2 N either (i)
is a truthful Nash equilibrium (TNE) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium, and T k is truthful relative to a for all k 2 N . Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that an e¢ cient action (it will be the industry-pro…t-maximizing licensee in our context) is chosen by the licensor in every TNE outcome in a menu auction: if (a ; T ) is a TNE, then we have a 2 argmax a2A [
Moreover, Bernheim and Whinston (1986) characterize the set of (potential licensees') TNE equilibrium payo¤ vectors u = (u 2 ; :::; u K ) 2 R N . Let S N be a subset of potential licensees, and let
where k (a) is …rm k's pro…t (k = 1; :::; K) when the set of potential licensees is a. That is, W N nS is the maximum amount of group N nS's total pro…t that can be achieved without help from S. Speci…cally, W ; ( ) = max a2A 1 (a) denotes the pro…t that the licensor can achieve without having a licensee, and W N ( ) denotes the total industry pro…ts. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that the set of TNE payo¤s of licensors u is the Pareto-frontier (for licensees, N ) of the following set: for all S N such that S 6 = ;,
They also show that in menu auction games, the set of truthful Nash equilibria (TNE) and the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE) are equivalent in this utility space. Now, we let the set of actions be the set of potential licensees, A = N = Knf1g, to apply menu auction game to a licensee selection problem. The agent is the licensor …rm 1. We call the licensee in a TNE of a menu auction a menu auction licensee. We can show the following result.
Proposition 3. A menu auction licensee is at least as e¢ cient as a simple auction licensee (if one exists).
The underlying intuition of this proposition is that as a menu auction licensee is an industry-pro…t-maximizing partner, and a simple auction licensee is a three-…rm-pro…t-maximizing partner. Thus, the negative externality of the technology transfer would make an industry-pro…t-maximizing …rm more e¢ cient than a three-…rm-pro…t-maximizing partner to counteract the e¤ect of the greater negative externality. Propositions 2 and 3 can be summarized as the licensing partners'e¢ ciency ranking among di¤erent regimes in the following Theorem.
Theorem 3. Suppose that …rm 1 is licensing technology to another …rm. Under weakly concave demand, the licensing partner that maximizes the gains in their joint pro…t is weakly less e¢ cient than the partner determined in a simple auction (if one exists), and the latter is weakly less e¢ cient than the partner determined by a menu auction: i.e., menu auction licensee simple auction licensee joint-pro…t-maximizing partner ;
where …rms are ordered by e¢ ciency in a descending manner.
The following example illustrates that a joint-pro…t-maximizing (competitive equilibrium) partner, a simple auction licensee, and a menu auction licensee can be di¤erent. It is easy to see that …rm 3 is the menu auction licensee, since it is the industry-pro…t-maximizing partner, as we have seen before. With the characterization in Proposition 1, we can con…rm that …rm 4 is the simple auction licensee. It is also easy to see that …rm 5 is the joint-pro…t-maximizing partner (maximizes 1 (j) + j (j) 1 (1) j (j) over j = 2; :::; 5). Finally, for comparison, recall that …rm 4 is the social-welfare-maximizing partner.
Conclusion and Extensions
We have analyzed which rival a licensor would choose as a partner when rivals are heterogeneous. We assume that licensing entails a complete technology transfer and show that licensing between any pair of …rms would improve joint pro…ts (thus licensing is pro…table) as long as there are more than two …rms in the industry. However, jointly pro…table licensing can be welfare reducing. These results are in contrast with the ones in the duopoly case examined by Katz and Shapiro (1985) , as well as the welfare results others have found with homogeneous rivals (Katz and Shapiro 1986; Sen and Tauman 2007) . However, we show that licensing the most e¢ cient …rm's technology always improves social welfare, although a welfare-maximizing licensee might not be a joint-pro…t-maximizing licensee. Hence, when the licensee is determined by either a simple or a menu auction, the licensor might not select a welfare-maximizing licensee under these schemes, and the e¢ ciency of the licensee can be ordered by the licensing method: a joint-pro…t-maximizing licensee is less e¢ cient than a simple auction licensee, which in turn is less e¢ cient than a menu auction licensee.
In the previous sections, we assume that at most one …rm can get a license from the licensor, and that license contracts are restricted to …xed fees only. Although these simplifying assumptions are helpful in comparing licensees in di¤erent licensing schemes and criteria, it is obviously interesting to allow multiple licenses and more ‡exible licensing contracts (with royalties). We will analyze these extensions by simplifying the model, since these extensions clearly complicate the analysis. Thus, we will assume a linear demand P = 1 Q, and we discuss what can happen if we depart from the benchmark. There are a licensor, …rm 1, and K 1 potential licensees. We order …rms according to their marginal costs of production c 1 < c 2 ::: c K , and the licensor …rm 1's marginal cost is normalized to zero: c 1 = 0. Since …rms whose marginal cost is less than market price P = 1 Q survive, the equilibrium demand is written as Q + P K k=1 max f0; (1 Q) c k g = 0 by adding up the …rst-order conditions. Suppose that …rms 1; :::; j stay in the market. Then, equilibrium allocation is described by
Note that …rm j + 1's exiting the market implies that if …rm j + 1 remains in the market then c j+1 is not less than the market price, resulting in nonpositive pro…ts:
That is, …rm j + 1 is out if and only if c j+1 is higher than the market price when j …rms remain in the market. In this environment, we let …rm 1 choose a subset of …rms to license its technology to maximize its total pro…ts (own pro…ts and license fees). We will use menu auction as the rule of the game here, since there are widespread externalities among potential licensees and the menu auction by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) provides a tool for systematic analysis in such an environment by letting the licensor's action set A 2 N be the set of all subsets of potential licensees N = f2; :::; Kg. We …rst illustrate the complications generated by allowing multiple licenses by the following example. . In this case, if …rms 2, 3, and 4 get licenses, then …rms 5, 6, and 7 will be driven out of the market (inactive), since the market price is driven down to 0:2. However, this is not the equilibrium choice of licensees in a menu auction, as is seen by the following Note that in every truthful Nash equilibrium in a menu auction, the industry pro…ts are maximized. Thus, the equilibrium set of licensees is f2; 3g (or f2; 4g or f3; 4g, since …rms 2, 3, and 4 are symmetric). Note that the set of equilibrium licensees does not achieve the lowest number of surviving …rms in this example. That is, we can see that the predation itself is not the reason for the optimal set of the licensees. The TNE payo¤s can be calculated easily in this example due to this symmetry. Firm 2 is replaceable, so the license fees are (0:23625 0) 2 (0:23625 0:2) 2 = 0:0545 (they can also be derived by solving the TNE payo¤s from the system (2) and (3)). With a slight modi…cation, we obtain a very di¤erent result: if c 5 = c 6 = c 7 = 0:24 instead of 0:23, then we can again show that f2; 3g is one of the equilibrium sets of licensees, while …rms 5, 6, and 7 are predated and the number of survivors is four including nonlicensed …rm 4. Note that licensing …rms 2, 3, and 4 predates …rms 5, 6, and 7 as well, but the licensor does not give three licenses. Thus, in this case, the licensor chooses the smallest set of licensors that achieves the smallest number of active …rms in the industry.
Although Example 2 is intriguing, it also shows that it is di¢ cult to obtain general results in a multiple licensing case. Note that this example is one of the simplest ones with heterogeneous potential licensees and possibilities of predation. Adding more elements will complicate the analysis further. For example, adding …xed cost of operation (the …xed cost that needs to be paid in order to stay in the market) a¤ects the results of licensing, since predation e¤ect on the ine¢ cient …rms would be stronger -licensing superior technology to (possibly multiple) …rms reduces the pro…ts of nonrecepient …rms of the technology, forcing them out of the market. This idea has been analyzed by Creane and Konishi (2009a) in the case where technology transfer is made without monetary transfer. 11 With a licensing fee, this motivation is strengthened further since potential licensees would compete over technology more vigorously when their survival in the industry is at stake. Moreover, the licensor (and surviving …rms) might prefer licensing technology to a very ine¢ cient …rm to push the market price su¢ ciently low to predate many other …rms. Once …rms exit, the market price jumps up again, increasing the pie to be shared. Although this sort of motivation for licensing complicates the analysis even further, the general tendency of the results can be simpli…ed -the licensor tends to choose a subset of licensees to drive out as many …rms as possible. We conclude this paper by providing an example that allows royalties in the licensing contract. Sen and Tauman (2007) and others analyze license contracts involving royalties and …xed fees. The usefulness of including royalties for the licensor is that it o¤ers a tool to control a licensee's output level and the market price. That is, the licensor's action is written as a = (S; (r k ) k2S ), where r k 2 R is …rm k's royalty. The set of actions is denoted by A, and potential licensee k's strategy is
is the licensee fee that …rm k 2 N pays when the set of licensees is S and their royalties are (r k 0 ) k 0 2S . However, because including royalties greatly complicates the problem, we will only consider a symmetric licensee case, identical marginal costs c > 0. Let n 2 f0; 1; :::; K 1g be the number of non-licensees. Using n, the number of licensees is described by K 1 n. For each case, the highest pro…t that the licensor and licensees can achieve together (joint pro…t (n)) is to jointly produce Q(n) taking n …rms best responses into account. It is easy to calculate the Stackelberg allocation for each n < K 1 (n = K 1 means no licensee). Let P (n) be the market price, Q(n) and (n) be joint output and joint pro…t of the licensor and licensees, and q(n) and (n) be the output and pro…t of each non-licensee.
, and
, then Q(n) = 1 c, q(n) = 0, P (n) = c, (n) = c (1 c), (n) = 0.
Using the above formulas, we can determine the TNE menu auction license allocations of the following simple example. Note that (n) corresponds to W N nS ( ) with jSj = n in (2). If n = 1 (one non-licensee), then royalty and the marginal cost are the same (r = c = 0:2) and the market outcome looks identical to the Cournot outcome (n = 4). However, in the n = 1 case, three licensees' marginal costs are actually zero, so the licensor can exploit all royalty fees although production levels are the same. If n = 2, then the licensor does not charge royalties. If n = 3 (one licensee), then in this case, the royalty is negative: that is, the licensor gives the licensee a production subsidy. Note that the market price is just marginal cost, and all three non-licensees cannot produce anything. The licensor uses the licensee as a dummy to shut out other …rms from the market. This is how subsidy is given to the licensee. Finally, if n = 0 (W N nS ( ) = W N ( )), then it is clearly a monopoly allocation. The licensor charges P = r = 0:5, forcing licensees to shut down. This means that the license-…xed fee needs to be negative. This can be done if the lower bound for transfer takes a negative value. We consider two cases: a ‡exible license contract case and a contracts with nonnegative …xed fees and royalties case. The TNE equilibrium payo¤ vectors (u 1 ; u 2 ; :::; u 7 ) and license fee vectors can be analyzed by using (2) and (3) (u 1 can be calculated from u = (u 2 ; :::; u 7 )). The binding constraint is (5), and together with Pareto e¢ ciency among licensees W N ( ) = 0:25 no longer holds, since without negative …xed fees, no licensee has an incentive to sign a contract that asks it to shut down its production. In this case, the most e¢ cient license choice is to give licenses to three …rms (n = 1): W N ( ) = (1) + (1) = 0:19. Moreover, in the case of n = 3, r 0 is imposed, so the best allocation for the licensor is simply to set r = 0. This implies a Cournot equilibrium with two zero marginal cost …rms and three non-licensees, which generates (3) = 0:142. In this case, the modi…cation of (7) will be binding: The menu auction TNE license contract is a combination of "no …xed fee" and a royalty of 0:2 to three licensees, leaving one …rm unlicensed. This result may seem to contradict a result in Sen and Tauman (2007) , since they show that there is no equilibrium with royalties only. This di¤erence arises from a di¤erence in the rules of the game: they consider a game in which the licensor announces a licensing policy, unlike our menu auction game.
By allowing …xed fees and production-prohibitive royalties (case 1), the licensor can e¤ectively achieve a monopoly and licensing becomes an anti-competitive act. It is interesting to note that the licensor earns higher pro…t in the restricted case 2. This is because both W N ( ) and W fkg ( ) are modi…ed by the restrictions, and the binding constraint changes from (5) to (7) . This observation con…rms that allowing di¤erent classes of licensing contracts complicates the results further. Moreover, the results are sensitive to the setup and restrictions of the game.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1. First note that the equilibrium output of …rm i, q i , is expressed by equation
if P (Q) > c i , and q i = 0 if P (Q) c i . Recall that c 1 c 2 : : : c K . Summing up the …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization over …rms in subset L K, and assuming that these …rms produce positive outputs, we obtain
where L also denotes the number of …rms in L. If the solution of the above equation Q satis…es P (Q) c`for all`2 L, and P (Q) < c k for all k 2 KnL, then Q is the equilibrium aggregate output. Rewriting the above equation, we obtain
The LHS of the above equation is continuous in Q, although it is not continuously di¤er-entiable since …rms stop producing in order as Q increases. 12 However, for each L K, the LHS is di¤erentiable for Q satisfying P (Q) c`for all`2 L, and P (Q) < c k for all k 2 KnL, and the derivative is
Summing the strategic substitutability conditions up over …rms`2 L, we obtain
This implies that the LHS of the aggregated …rst-order condition is decreasing in Q since P 0 (Q) < 0. This implies that equilibrium aggregate output Q is uniquely determined for every marginal cost pro…le (c 1 ; : : : ; c K ). Now, we conduct a comparative static analysis with respect to c j . By the above analysis, it is easy to see that Q decreases as c j increases if P (Q) > c j , and Q is intact otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2. In scenario (i) c j goes down to c i , while in scenario (ii) c j 0 goes down to c i . Suppose that in scenario (i), …rms`2 L remain in operation: q`> 0 (and …rms k 2 KnL chooses q k = 0). Clearly, …rms i and j will be in operation after technology transfer: i; j 2 L. First consider the case where j 0 2 L in scenario (i). Then, the aggregate outputQ in scenario (i) is described by (recall that …rm j's cost is c i )
Since P 0 (Q)Q + P k2K max f0; P (Q) c k g is a decreasing function in Q, the equilibrium aggregate outputQ in scenario (ii) satis…esQ <Q.
Second, consider the case where j 0 = 2 L in scenario (i). Since c j < c j 0 and P (Q) < c j 0 , the aggregate outputQ in scenario (i) is
Thus, as before, the equilibrium aggregate outputQ in scenario (ii) satis…esQ <Q if P (Q) c j > 0, andQ =Q, otherwise.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof utilizes an arti…cial market. This device is useful because transferring technology partially can reduce the joint pro…t. We …rst replace …rm j with an arti…cial (public: not pro…t-maximizing) …rm i 0 with marginal cost c i , but control its output level so that the joint pro…t between …rms i and i 0 increases monotonically. After that, we return to the original economy.
Consider an arti…cial market parametrized by 2 [0; 1], in which …rm j (c i < c j ) is replaced by an arti…cial …rm i 0 that satis…es (i) c i 0 = c i , (ii) q i 0 ( ) = q i ( ), and (iii) (q k ( )) k6 =i 0 is a solution of the system of equations: q k ( ) = max n 0;
That is, although the output decision by …rm i 0 is linked with that of …rm i, …rms k 6 = i 0 do not use this information by choosing the best response to Q k ( ) = P`6 =k q`( ) (the standard Cournot behavior, not the Stackelberg one). Note that when = 1, Q(1) is the aggregate Cournot equilibrium output after the complete technology transfer from …rm i to …rm j, since the best response by …rm i 0 is identical to the one by …rm i when = 1.
In the following, we will show that in this arti…cial market, the joint pro…t of …rms i and i 0 ,
, increases monotonically as goes up (step 1). Then, we connect this arti…cial economy with the original economy before technology transfer (step 2).
(Step 1) The best response by …rm k 6 = i 0 is described by
Since …rm i will be in operation after technology transfer, we have
thus we can write
As before, we denote the cardinality of L( ) by L( ) as well. Summing up these equations, we have
Totally di¤erentiating the above, we have
:
The inequality is strict as long as there is at least one …rm with a di¤erent marginal cost from others (i.e., if P 00 (Q)q k + P 0 (Q) = 0 holds then P 00 (Q)q`+ P 0 (Q) < 0 must hold due to the strategic substitutability assumption). That is, for each L K with L = L( ) for some range of 2 [0; 1], dQ d > 0 holds for the range of . This implies that Q( ) monotonically increases as increases, resulting in monotonic reduction of P (Q( )). Since …rms shut down their production in order from higher marginal cost ones (if any …rm does), the set of active …rms L( ) shrinks in a nested manner:
increases as increases. We consider (To save space, we omit Q ( ) for P (Q ( )).)
> 0. We can determine the sign of
0 must follow, and the …rst term in the bracket of the last line is nonnegative for all 2 [0; 1]. Since L( ) 3 with interior solution, we have Q > (1 + )q i , and P 0 q i + P c i = 0 holds by …rm i's …rst-order condition. This implies that the second term is positive. Thus, we can conclude that
Step 2) Now, we show that the equilibrium allocation with …rm j is mimicked by an equilibrium allocation in our arti…cial market at a certain^ 2 (0; 1). Let (P ; (q k ) K k=1 ) be the Cournot equilibrium allocation before …rm j received a complete technology transfer. Let^ =q ĵ q i . Since c j > c i , we haveq i >q j 0 and 0 <^ < 1. Thus, (P ; (q k ) K k=1 ) = (P (^ ); (q k (^ )) K k=1 ) holds, and the initial equilibrium allocation is mimicked by the equilibrium in an arti…cial market with =^ . Sinceq j =^ q i =^ q i (^ ), we have^ i +^ j = P c i q i + P c j q j = (P (^ ) c i ) q i (^ ) + (P (^ ) c j )^ q i (^ )
Since J ( ) is monotonically increasing in , we have J (^ ) < J (1). Since J (1) is the same as the joint pro…t by …rms i and j after the complete technology transfer from …rm i to …rm j, we can conclude that the joint pro…t by …rms i and j must increase after the complete technology transfer.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 1, we know that if a technology transfer is made from a technologically superior …rm to a technologically inferior …rm, the equilibrium aggregate output Q increases. Now consider …rm k. If C decreases keeping c k constant, Q increases while q k shrinks. We can represent the relationship between Q and q k (through changes in C behind) as follows:
Denote the original (before transfer) equilibrium by "hat," and the new equilibrium by "tilde."Since …rm j's marginal cost c j only goes down fromĉ j = c j toc j = c i keeping all other marginal costs constant, we haveQ <Q andq k >q k for all k 6 = j.
14 Then, we haveq j <q j andq j q j >Q Q . Since the social welfare is written as SW = (total bene…t) (total cost) = Hence, we conclude g SW > d SW .
T j = j (j) j (j ) for all j 6 = j and T j = max j2Knf1g f 1 (j)+ j (j) j (j )g 1 (j ). It is easy to check that all conditions for a Nash equilibrium are satis…ed.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let j 2 argmax j2K [( 1 (j) + j (j)) ( 1 (1) + j (1))] be a joint-pro…t-maximizing partner. Suppose to the contrary that there exists k > j with c k > c j such that 1 (k) + k (k) + j (k) > 1 (j ) + k (j ) + j (j ). Since we have
, it is easy to see j (k) k (j ) > j (1) k (1) > 0. First consider j (k) = 0. Then k (j ) = 0, which is a contradiction. Second, consider k (j ) = 0. Then we have P (Q j ) c k where Q j is the equilibrium aggregate output when …rm j obtains the license. However,
where the second inequality comes from P 0 (Q 1 ) < P 0 (Q k ) and the third inequality comes from P (Q 1 ) > P (Q j ) P (Q k ). This is a contradiction. Finally, consider j (k) 0 and k (j ) 0. We have
since P 0 (Q j ) < P 0 (Q k ) by weak concavity of P and Lemma 2. Then we have
since 2P (Q 1 ) P (Q k ) + P (Q j ), P 0 (Q 1 ) < P 0 (Q j ) and from equilibrium conditions we have c k c j = [ P 0 (Q k )] Q k [ P 0 (Q j )] Q j + K [P (Q j ) P (Q k )] so that 0 P (Q k ) P (Q j ) + c k c j c k c j . Hence, we have j (k) k (j ) < j (1) k (1), which is a contradiction. 
